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Abstract: 
The concept of differentiated integration (DI) is practically invisible in Slovenian politics. The analysis 
showed that the key words associated with DI are seldom used in parliamentary debates, coalition 
programmes or prime ministerial speeches. This suggests that the issue of DI is more a topic of 
academic discussion than of daily politics. While the low salience of DI in Slovenian political debates 
makes it hard to establish governmental positions in detail, the common thread throughout Slovenian 
foreign policy from independence in 1991 onwards has been that a strong and united EU is of key 
importance for Slovenia. The few instances where wording related to DI models was used reflect a 
concern about a multi-speed Europe, especially a fear that a multi-tier EU would mean fewer 
opportunities for future Slovenian governments and in general, fewer opportunities for smaller 
and/or less developed countries. 
Keywords: differentiated integration; multi-speed EU; Slovenia 
Introduction2 
The citizens of the Republic of Slovenia endorsed Slovenia’s path to European Union 
(EU) membership by an overwhelming majority of votes (89.64 %) in a referendum on 
23 March 2003. The country joined the EU in 2004, adopted the euro at the beginning 
of 2007 and joined Schengen by the end of the same year. In 2008, Slovenia chaired 
the EU Council, a role that it again held in the second half of 2021. This amply 
demonstrates that the country is highly pro-EU regardless of the political party in the 
government, as it is widely believed that EU membership is crucial for Slovenia's 
development and security.  
 
1 The research leading to this report was conducted within the InDivEU project. The project has received funding 
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 
822304. The funders had no role in the study design, data collection or analysis. The article is also a result of the 
research program “Slovenia and its Actors in International Relations and European Integration (P5-01777)”. 
2 The authors wish to acknowledge with thanks the constructive comments of Stefan Telle and an anonymous 




Almost all political parties in the National Assembly (except one: The Slovenian 
National Party, SNS) support Slovenian membership of the European Union. 
Nevertheless, there are differences in their perceptions of the European Union: 
whereas the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) of the current Prime Minister Janša 
argue that Slovenia should enhance its relations with the Visegrád Group (V4) and 
other central European countries, the liberal trio (the Party of the Modern Centre, 
SMC; the List of Marjan Šarec, LMŠ; and the Party of Alenka Bratušek, SAB) emphasise 
that Slovenia is part of core Europe.3 In geographical terms, the position of the Social 
Democrats (SD) is not so clear, but together with New Slovenia–Christian Democrats 
(NSi) they aim for Slovenia to be more proactive in the EU institutions. 
Despite this general pro-European outlook, many of the more complex issues related 
to the EU are not well publicised and therefore public awareness of how the EU 
functions is relatively low. The ambition of this article is, first, to discover the extent to 
which Slovenian governments talk about differentiated integration (DI). Secondly, we 
want to determine what positions they take on DI. Does Slovenian politics support the 
idea of a ‘Multi-Speed EU’ and if so, which are the national preferences? Which, if any, 
are the differentiated integration mechanisms (enhanced co-operation, opt-out 
mechanism) the Slovenian government might prefer? Are these mechanisms applied 
in Slovenian EU politics? 
In this article, we explore the presence of DI discussion in the Slovenian political space, 
which issues generated the most attention, and especially how DI is understood by 
Slovenian politicians, be they members of government or members of Parliament. The 
research confirmed our initial expectation that in Slovenia a debate about 
differentiated integration (DI) is barely present, and that the mechanisms of DI are not 
well known. The fact that Slovenian public opinion as well as official politics are 
committed to the European Union does not mean that today debate on EU issues is 
common in government bodies or the general public. The article is structured as 
follows. The next section discusses theory and methods. The article then presents the 
main findings and observations and concludes with brief discussion of their policy 
relevance.   
Theory and methods  
Partly as a consequence of enlargement, but also due to a number of other complex 
issues which have needed to be addressed by the EU in recent years, theoretical 
discussion on the concept of differentiated integration has been on the rise (among 
others, see Stubb 1996, Leuffen et al. 2013, Rittberger at al. 2015, Schimmelfennig & 
Winzen 2020). As pointed out by Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012), there are a 
number of normative concepts and approaches, providing us with a systematic 
overview of theorizing on differentiated integration. 
The theoretical framework of this article follows that described in the introduction to 
this issue (Telle et al. 2021), distinguishing between policy differentiation and polity 
differentiation. The first one relates in particular to different preferences and 
capacities of the member states as to the integration (demand-side) and offers option 
to more reluctant members of not join in all policies, while not preventing others to 
 
3In Slovenia, this usually refers to the countries of Benelux, Germany and France.  
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move ahead. In the case of polity differentiation, the categorization of differentiated 
integration in terms of time, space, and matter (Stubb 1996) is followed.  
We distinguished two different models of polity differentiation. On the one hand, the 
‘multi-speed EU’ model depicts DI as a temporary phenomenon and implies that all 
Member States (MSs) will ultimately reach the same level of integration. We started 
with the assumption that the concept of differentiated integration, which enables 
different dynamics of cooperation to member countries, is less acceptable to the so 
called new Member States, which during the period of their accession already had to 
prove that they are capable of adopting the full range of EU policies. Yet, the complexity 
of EU rules has already had practical consequences for both older and newer members: 
here we are thinking in particular of the monetary union and Schengen – while some 
Member States decided against these policies and opted not to adopt the euro, others 
simply have not met the criteria yet. As Slovene ambition from day one was to fully 
embrace all EU policies as quickly as possible, ideas of deeper integration were 
supported. This would suggest that the Slovenian stance would not favour DI in any 
form. 
On the other hand, the ‘multi-end EU’ model depicts DI as a potentially permanent 
feature of European integration. In this model, the MSs do not necessarily strive to 
reach similar levels of integration. Instead, each MS can ‘pick and choose’ policies to 
adjust its own level of integration to national preferences and capacities, with the end 
result being the co-existence of multiple overlapping regimes of integration. This so 
called “multi-end” model may in principle be more acceptable from the integration 
policy efficiency perspective, but the question remains as to whether membership or 
lack thereof in a particular circle is a free choice of the Member State or a selective 
policy of the “core” countries towards those presumably less capable. 
For the analysis of the salience of DI, we counted keywords (Appendix 1) in repositories 
of parliamentary debates. The suggested keywords were translated and adapted to the 
Slovenian language and jargon that is usually employed when discussing European 
affairs. Therefore, some Slovenian equivalents are not simply translated, but logically 
adapted to the political discourse in the country.4 A major source was provided by the 
research group involved in the CLARIN project (European Research Infrastructure for 
Language Resources and Technology), a part of the EU infrastructure ESFRI.5 The 
relevant data is in the siParl corpus, a database included in CLARIN6 .  
In addition, for the years in which we identified a peak in the salience of DI, the authors 
looked at the original documents in the database. This way, the context in which a 
particular DI model was addressed could be identified, and instances of a different use 
of a specific term eliminated.7 This proved to be fruitful since the mere counting of the 
results in parliamentary debates only seldom included the keywords identified as 
search variables. The authors did not focus only on key words/catchwords, but also on 
 
4 Here, the authors wish to thank to Tomaž Erjavec, from the Slovenian CLARIN team, for his valuable assistance 
and guidance. 
5 European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures. See more at https://www.clarin.eu/content/clarin-in-a-
nutshell. 
6 CLARIN corpus comprises over 10 thousand sessions of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the 
period from 1990 to 2918, which covers one million speeches or 200 million words. (Pančur et al. 2020). 
7 For example, the term “differentiated integration” was used during the parliamentary debate on the principles of 




the context that in some cases revealed the level of commitment and the attitude of 
Slovenia (through its politicians) to EU integration. 
For analysis of the government attitude towards DI, the authors identified and 
analysed documents where EU issues were expected to be discussed. The selection 
included the last three coalition agreements (period 2014–2022)8, the three speeches 
of the Prime Ministers (PMs) after their election in the National Assembly (2014, 2018, 
2020)9, the speech of the PM Janez Janša addressing the European Parliament during 
the Slovenian Presidency of the European Council in 2008, and the transcript of the 
public debate at the National Assembly dedicated to the presentation of the White 
Paper on the future of the Europe10 by the European Commission, held on 15 June 
2017. Also, different sessions of the Parliamentary Committees, where debates 
included some of the identified DI keywords, were analysed. 
The timeframe of the analysis is 1992–2018, even though Slovenia joined the EU only 
in 2004. This timeframe was selected as already during the political debates on 
Slovenian independence, the fact that the country wanted to adhere to the EU (at the 
time, the EEC) was very much present. It was therefore expected that Slovenia would 
put much effort into presenting itself as a suitable potential EU member. Our 
expectation was that some of the key words linked to the EU would be present even in 
the pre-accession period. 
Polity differentiation 
The analysis of prime ministerial speeches in the national parliament on the occasion 
of addressing the parliament after taking office, or in the European Parliament when 
taking over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, showed no use of DI-
related key words.  
With Slovenia taking over the presidency of the EU Council in 2008, Prime Minister 
Janez Janša addressed the European Parliament on 16 January 2008, presenting the 
priorities of its EU Council presidency as the first new Member State to hold the office. 
Yet, in his speech, the Prime Minister did not use any of the phrases associated with 
DI.  
Our qualitative analysis included also the three prime minister’s speeches delivered at 
the inauguration of their mandates. Most of the addresses focused on domestic issues, 
with the EU barely mentioned. Even though each of the prime ministers represented 
 
8 Coalition Agreement Cerar et al., Koalicijski Sporazum o Sodelovanju v Vladi Republike Slovenje za Mandatno 
Obdobje 2014–2018. September 2014. https://www.strankasmc.si/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/KOALICIJSKI%20SPORAZUM_PARAFIRAN_201400903.pdf; Coalition Agreement 
Šarec et al., Koalicijski Sporazum o Sodelovanju v Vladi Republike Slovenje za Mandatno Obdobje 2018-2022. 
August 2018. https://www.strankalms.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Koalicijski-sporazum-o-sodelovanju-v-
Vladi-Republike-Slovenije-za-mandatno-obdobje-2018%E2%80%932022.pdf; Coalition Agreement Janša et al. 
Koalicijsko Pogodbo o Sodelovanju v Vladi Republike Slovenje 2020-2022. https://siol.net/galleries/gallery-
231927/?image=1. 
9 Speech by designated PM (prior to the election) Miro Cerar (2014). http://www.dz-
rs.si/wps/portal/Home/deloDZ/seje/evidenca?mandat=VII&type=sz&uid=21C8F2C86F5604FDC1257D43004A
87D0; Speech by designated PM (prior to the election) Marjan Šarec (2018) https://www.strankalms.si/nagovor-
kandidata-za-predsednika-vlade-rs-marjana-sarca-na-5-izredni-seji-dz/; Speech by the designated PM (prior to 
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different political positions, the attitude to the EU did not differ much between them. 
Once again, there was only a single reference to DI: a two-tier EU was commented on 
by one of the PMs, and a belief that Slovenia should strive towards staying in the core 
of the EU was stated.  
Three coalition agreements were analysed: the government of Miro Cerar, which was 
a coalition of three parties and was in office from 2014 to 2018; the government of 
Marjan Šarec, a minority coalition of five parties, which stepped down at the beginning 
of 2020; and the current government of Janez Janša, a coalition of four parties 
expected to be in power until mid- 2022. The documents confirm speculation that DI 
and even general discussion on the future of the EU and the role of Slovenia within it 
attracted only limited attention from the government and political parties. What we 
found is that in the analysed documents, discussions seldom moved beyond standard 
phrases on the need to strengthen the EU and Slovenian active cooperation.  
Moreover, differentiated integration was not a common topic in Slovenian 
parliamentary debates. The analysis of sessions in the National Assembly did not result 
in any entries for ‘differentiated integration.’11 As such, there were just three moments 
in the last 25 years in which conceptual key words related to DI were used more 
frequently in parliamentary debates (Figure 1). These were the years 1993, 2004 and 
2017. What can be seen from these debates is that the concept of different speeds in 
the EU was always associated with the position of Slovenia. As such, speakers almost 
never discussed the relevance of possible differentiation for the European future, but 
mostly only the Slovenian position on these potential developments, urging the 
country to try to stay with the most dynamic group of countries. In general, a 
substantial debate about the future of Europe was non-existent. Speakers only referred 
to the ‘future of Europe’ as something that should be debated and should evolve, but 
in fact this was just a euphemism for positioning Slovenia in core Europe. 
Figure 1 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates 
 
 
11 This can be explained by the fact that in the Slovenian language politicians do not use the term ‘diferencirana 
integracija/ diferencirano povezovanje’ but instead the term ‘level of integration.’ The search therefore included 
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Looking at the distribution of the conceptual key words, we found that ‘core Europe,’ 
‘two-speed Europe’ and ‘multi-speed Europe’ were the key phrases most used in 
parliamentary debates, with ‘core Europe’ and ‘two-speed Europe’ representing more 
than 80% of all the key phrases.  
The multi-speed Europe model 
The terms ‘two-speed Europe’ and ‘multi-speed Europe’ were debated mostly in the 3rd 
and 7th terms of the National Assembly. Whereas the 3rd term marked the last phase of 
Slovenia’s accession to the EU, the 7th term followed the 2015 migration crisis and the 
period when the five scenarios for the future of the EU were presented.  
The analysis done using CLARIN showed that from 1992 to 2018 ‘two-speed Europe’ 
was used 63 times in debates in the National Assembly. Two more substantial peaks 
were identified in the legislative terms 2000û2004 and 2014–2018. What is 
interesting is that prior to Slovenian membership of the EU, and again a decade later, 
Slovenian politicians and decision-makers used the term ‘two speed Europe’ for 
differently intensified integration. However, in all the interventions Slovenia ‘wanted’ 
to be part of the countries in the “first-speed” or the core Europe. All the parties agreed 
that Slovenia should avoid being a part of a ‘second-speed’ Europe. There was a 
consensus in the National Assembly that Slovenia should accelerate its adoption of 
various EU regulations and policies, so as to be an integral part of core Europe. 
In the Slovenian case, ‘two-speed Europe’ is also used as a synonym for three-, four- or 
multi-speed Europe. Therefore, the key phrase ‘multi-speed Europe’ was found in few 
debates in the National Assembly. Of 19 entries, 17 were in the last legislative period 
(2014–2018). This relatively high number of hits can be attributed to the fact that there 
was a special session of the Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs discussing 
the White Paper in June 2017.12 In this session, ‘multi-speed Europe’ was mentioned 
six times by a scholar from the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana 
in his speech, seven times by centre-right party members of parliament (MPs) and 
three times by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. ‘Multi-speed Europe’ was mostly linked 
to a negative perception, suggesting that development of the EU in this direction is not 
to be supported.  
In sum, with regard to two-speed or multi-speed EU, we can detect a negative 
connotation associated with these developments, and particularly concern as to 
whether the new Member States like Slovenia would be able to participate fully in what 
was considered a more privileged first-tier group of countries. 
The multi-end Europe model 
On the other hand, debate on ‘core Europe’ was relevant mostly in the 1st term of the 
National Assembly (1992–1996) when Slovenia started its path towards EU 
integration, and during the 7th term (2014–2018) when the PM decided that Slovenia 
should be part of the ‘core countries’ and personally relied on the three Benelux Prime 
Ministers to support Slovenia in this attempt. This means that the Slovenian 
 
12 This is presented in detail in the next section. 
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government coordinated its activities at the EU level with the three Benelux 
countries.13 
Maybe the most explicit reference to DI was found in the coalition agreement in August 
2018, where it states: 
“The strategic interest of Slovenia is to be in the core of the EU, which will 
guarantee equal conditions for development. Slovenia will advocate for a further 
deepening of the European Monetary Union, a strengthening of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy with its upgrading to a common defence policy, 
along with respect for the Schengen system and the protection of the EU 
external borders.” 
The Prime Minister, Marjan Šarec, in his address on 17 August 2018 explicitly used the 
term ‘two-tier Europe’:  
“On top of this, we can observe in praxis a two-tier Europe already. The EU will 
have to find the answers to the common questions as soon as possible, since 
without them the future may be bleak. Slovenia needs to struggle towards 
remaining within the so called ‘core countries.” 
Recent developments: Future of Europe and Slovenia’s Council Presidency 
We were also interested in whether debates on differentiated integration took place in 
the context of wider debates on the ‘future of Europe’ (FoE). To this end, the frequency 
of the conceptual key words was compared to the frequency of the key phrase ‘future 
of Europe.’ In the Slovenian case, the period in which their co-occurrence was mostly 
relevant was 2000–2004. This was the case first because Slovenia was joining the EU, 
and second because the Convention on the future of Europe was ongoing. The debates 
in that period were mostly linked to the ‘future (of Slovenia) in Europe.’ Speakers used 
‘future of Europe’ to debate Slovenia’s accession rather than issues actually related to 
the future of the EU. The period 2005–2008 is mostly linked to the ratification of the 
Constitution of the EU (and later the Lisbon Treaty) and to the then forthcoming 
(2008) Slovenian presidency of the Council of the EU. 2017 was the next peak of the 
key phrase ‘future of Europe.’ This can be attributed mostly to the presentation of the 
White Paper on the future of Europe in the Parliamentary Committee of European 
Affairs (OZEU) and also to public discussion of the five scenarios. Even this dedicated 
discussion showed that the terms identified as relating to DI were not commonly used. 
In the discussion, only a few academics and politicians participated. Their positions 
can be grouped into the following categories: 
a) An overall position in many discussions related to the EU is that a strong and 
united EU is in the interest of Slovenia; 
b) Slovenia should try its best to remain in the ‘core,’ within the ‘first tier’ EU, and 
strive towards strengthening the EU; 
c) Any differentiated integration (even if not explicitly called such) can be harmful 
for Slovenia as a small and less developed member country as it increases 
 
13 ‘Core Europe’ is untranslatable in Slovenian. This is why in Slovenian EU jargon the synonym ‘Benelux (+ 




inequality among the member countries and gives an even stronger voice to the 
larger members. 
Much more critical towards the EU is the current Prime Minister Janez Janša. In his 
inaugural address on 13 March 2020 he spoke in particular about the tasks facing 
Slovenia with regard to the forthcoming presidency of the EU Council.14 According to 
his opinion, one cannot expect there to be equality in the EU: 
“A country with 400 thousand people and a country of 90 million cannot have 
the same weight anywhere in the world, and this is true of the EU too. We are 
not equal, we have as much weight as can be expressed through GDP, population 
size, etc. The impact may be more significant if you are more skilful and here we 
are with the question of equality.”  
Janša cited his experience during the Council presidency, recalling that if a proposal 
came from a smaller country, the Council administration often found a number of legal 
obstacles to its implementation. However, once one of the larger countries sponsored 
the proposal, the legal counterarguments evaporated. He concluded “In this way we 
were a witness of how equality works.” 
We can conclude that the attitude towards DI by various Slovenian governments is 
negative, since there is a feeling that such developments may leave smaller, 
economically and politically weaker countries out of some important decision-making 
processes. Yet, especially in academic circles, hardly anyone shares the belief that 
Slovenian political ambition to belong to the core is realistic. The key reason for such 
doubts is the lack of capacity to play an important role. 
Policy differentiation and the mechanisms of differentiation 
The analysis now moves from polity differentiation to a discussion of policy 
differentiation and the two main instruments: enhanced cooperation and opt-outs. 
Neither term was used much in parliamentary discussions: especially the term “opt-
out” was hardly ever used (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Frequency of enhanced cooperation and opt-outs in parliamentary debates 
 
The key DI mechanism phrases did not appear in parliamentary debates before the 
year 2000. In 2007, opt-outs were mentioned 18 times, representing 70% of all 
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mentions of opt-outs over the last 25 years. The term ‘enhanced co-operation’ was by 
far the most frequent in Slovenian parliamentary debates.  
Looking at which policies with enhanced cooperation are discussed (Figure 3), we find 
that the financial transaction tax15 was an issue in 2012, 2013 and 2014, while the 
situation reversed in 2017 when the issues of the European public prosecutor16 and 
PESCO17 became more visible. For 2018, the high numbers can only be attributed to 
PESCO. The Unitary Patent was mentioned for the first time in 2012 and reached a 
peak in 2016. After that, there were no more entries in parliamentary debates. 
Mentions of the Unitary Patent represented 4% of the total references to DI instances. 
Finally, other instances of enhanced co-operation, such as Rome III, were not 
mentioned in parliamentary debates. Overall, enhanced cooperation policies were 
most frequently discussed between 2012 and 2014 and in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 3). 
The first period was when Slovenia was dealing with a relatively harsh economic crisis. 
At that time, debates were mostly linked to issues related to the crisis and especially to 
its resolution. In 2017 and 2018, the debate on enhanced co-operation was linked to 
Juncker’s five scenarios and to co-operation with ‘core Europe’ countries. 
Figure 3 Breakdown of enhanced cooperation policies, 1990–2018 (n= 597)  
 
International agreements among EU Member States are a third mechanism through 
which differentiation takes place. Figure 4 shows that references to these so-called 
inter-se agreements reached the highest frequency in 2017. This was mostly on account 
of the debate on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in Slovenia. These debates 
were mostly linked to the issue of the bailout of Slovenian banks in 2013. Due to the 
economic and financial crisis, the Bratušek government made a commitment to the 
European Commission that Slovenia would privatise all banks that were still state-
 
15 “The objective of the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is to ensure that the financial sector makes a fair 
contribution to national tax revenues. It is also intended to discourage transactions that do not enhance the 
efficient allocation of resources by the financial markets” (Karaboycheva 2021). 
16 The European Public Prosecutor Office is an independent Union body competent to fight crimes against the 
Union budget (see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/networks-and-bodies-
supporting-judicial-cooperation/european-public-prosecutors-office_en). 
17 PESCO stays for a Permanent Structured Cooperation, part of the EU security and defence policy, formed in 






















owned by 2018. As the next Cerar’s government (2014–2018) accelerated the process 
of bank privatisation in 2017, this was also reflected in parliamentary debates. 
Therefore, the SRM was mentioned several times in the context of Slovenian bank 
privatisation, and it de facto had little to do with the attitude towards inter-se 
agreements. Thus, the debate was more related to its unfairness and conditionality 
regarding Slovenian economic policy. 
The other two inter-se agreements important in parliamentary debates were the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Unitary Patent Court. However, in 
relative terms, the latter was more relevant for parliamentarians, with 102 entries 
found for it and only 30 for the ESM. The Prüm Convention18 was mentioned only once 
(by the Minister of the Interior, who called it the Prüm Treaty). Similarly, the fiscal 
compact was mentioned once by the Minister of Finance. 
Figure 4 The salience inter se agreements in parliamentary debates 
 
In sum, the key DI mechanism phrases did not appear in parliamentary debates before 
the year 2000. Overall, opt-outs were barely mentioned, and where they were, the term 
was mostly used in a general way (for instance, “there are some opt-outs”). The 
exception is the year 2007, when opt-outs were mentioned 18 times, representing 70% 
of all the mentions of opt-outs over the last 25 years. This can be attributed to the 
debate on the Lisbon treaty and opt-outs that some of the other EU countries had. On 
the other hand, the term ‘enhanced co-operation’ was by far the most present in 
Slovenian parliamentary debates. The issue was mostly present between 2011 and 2014 
and in 2017. The first period was when Slovenia was dealing with a relatively harsh 
economic crisis. At that time, debates were mostly linked to issues related to the crisis 
and especially to its resolution. In 2017, the debate on enhanced co-operation was 
linked to Juncker’s five scenarios and to co-operation with ‘core Europe’ countries. 
 
18 Prüm Convention deals with the “cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border 
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Discussion and Conclusion  
The analysis has shown that differentiated integration and the related instruments are 
not a topic which receives much attention in Slovenia. In spite of the importance the 
issue of differentiated integration bears for small, relatively less developed countries, 
surprisingly little attention is being paid to the issue by the government or by the 
citizens. At most, the discussion focuses on the position of Slovenia within the EU of 
different “speeds”.   
The government’s position on DI can barely be identified from the few references made 
to DI. In fact, the analysis has shown that, overall, the government position on 
European issues is not as clear and is surprisingly absent from Slovenian politics. If on 
one hand we see concern about not belonging to the “core”, we are surprised by the 
limited understanding of the DI and lack of engagement in the discussions on DI. One 
would expect a more pro-active stance in the light of the fact that Slovenia has been a 
full member of the European Union since 2004 and joined the Union with significant 
public support. Discussion of the EU and the Slovenian position within it is absent in 
government documents such as coalition agreements and inaugural speeches by prime 
ministers. In each of these texts, we could identify a single, or at most two, paragraphs 
related to the EU. In addition, the DI issue is only mentioned indirectly – at most, the 
position identified in these documents is that Slovenia should maintain its stance in 
favour of close integration of the Member States, strengthening the EU, and with active 
participation by Slovenia in all EU policies. 
The findings suggest that the complexity of the EU and its politics are not at the 
forefront of domestic political discussion. One of the possible explanations might be 
that Slovenia is still a relatively young state, and so much political attention is devoted 
to the internal issues of building institutions, policies and government practice within 
the country. The other reason may be that the voters have been satisfied with the fact 
that Slovenia has successfully joined the EU, the euro and Schengen, and that all of 
these make us feel sufficiently “European”. Developments beyond this may not be of 
significant interest to the public and are often poorly understood even by those who 
should know better, meaning the members of the national parliament. This is reflected 
in our research where the debates have shown limited knowledge of the topics related 
to specific DI mechanisms, which are therefore not discussed. 
The question is who should be interested in raising the level of awareness on the topics 
related to the future of the EU. It seems the political parties in Slovenia do not see 
discussions on the EU as arenas where political points among the voters can be scored. 
In a small member country, the primary focus is on domestic issues, and only on those 
effects of DI which may relate to the national interest. This means that we cannot 
expect the government to invest in popularisation of the EU, at least not beyond very 
basic information. Could one expect the European Commission to play a more pro-
active role? The Commission is engaged in various forms of communications, from 
elementary school to promotion of special events like the Conference on the Future of 
Europe. The intricate dilemmas of DI, where any relevant discussion requires a 
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Keywords of DI 






Coalition of the willing Koalicija voljnih The keyword is in Slovenia 
linked only to the Iraqi war. 
Two-speed Europe EU/Evropa dveh hitrosti  
Multi-speed Europe EU/Evropa več(ih) hitrosti  
Variable geometry Variabilna geometrija, 
variabilno povezovanje 
 
Core Europe Države Beneluksa 
(+Nemčija+Francija) 
Usually core Europe in 
Slovenian is “Benelux 
countries” (države 
Beneluksa) or expanded with 
Germany and France 
(+Nemčija+Francija) 
Two-tier Europe Dvotirna Evropa/EU  
Concentric circles Koncentrični krogi In 2011 the Slovenian MFA 
presented the strategy that 
would base Slovenian FP on 
concentric circles. These 
entries were not taken into 
consideration. 
á la carte á la carte  
Future of Europe Prihodnost Evrope/EU  
Enhanced cooperation Okrepljeno sodelovanje  
opt-out opt-out Does not have an established 
translation 
Pesco PESCO or PESKO  
Rome III Rome III  











Javni tožilec EU, Evropski 
javni tožilec 
 
Schengen Schengen, Šengen  
Economic and Monetary 
Union 
Ekonomska in monetarna 
unija, EMU 
 
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
Listina temeljnih pravic  
Prüm Convention Prumska pogodba  
European Stability 
Mechanism 
ESM, Evropski stabilnostni 
mehanizem 
 
Fiscal Compact Fiskalni pakt  
Single Resolution 
Mechanism 
Enotni finančni mehanizem  










Customs Union + Turkey Carinska unija + Turčija  
Eastern Partnership Vzhodno partnerstvo  
Euromed Euromed  
 
 
 
 
